In 2012, I wrote a long essay about the ICJ ruling on the land and maritime border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon and how it compares to the Badume conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ten years afterwards, the area continues to be critical to research on state legitimacy and its adherence to international law. Eritrea has minted cooperation with Ethiopia and has even cooperated with it in the latter’s war in the Tigray regions, this has earned Eritrea some legitimacy from Ethiopia, a life-support which Eritrea badly needs since being branded a pariah state. Cameroon and Nigeria since the 2006 Green-Tree agreement have taken active efforts to demarcate their borders and implement the ICJ verdict which largely favoured Cameroon, a bitter pill to swallow by Nigerian public and popular opinion.
Nigeria’s continuous thirst to re-assert sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula is what brings stalemate to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mix Commission’s tasks for the implementation of the ICJ resolution of the territorial disputes between these two states, condemned by geography and demography to eternally live beside or with each other. Asking for joint rights to exploitation of natural resources in the area, seriously throws away the Nigerian argument that their prime interest is about the welfare of the ethnic groups in the area who are of the same stock as those in the adjacent federated Cross-River and Akwa-Ibom states, a premise which also holds valid for neighbouring tribes in the Cameroon divisions of Ndian and Manyu. The federal governments resource governance record for local communities in the Creeks-Rivers-Niger Delta region, is an antithesis to this professed love.
What gives optimism despite the unmatched states’ capacities for disruptive unilateral action is their recourse to international mediation instruments. If a more nationalist regime helms power one day in Nigeria, the populist rhetoric could radically change the dynamics of Nigeria’s regional power identity projection. By African standards, Cameroon is an emerging middle-power, whose external political philosophy is pacifist. This external soft-power projection is a curtain to shade its internal shortcomings from external amplifications. Major internal fragilities such as its violent suppression of political dissent and public liberties, bad governance, rent seeking, a civil-military relation with loyalty to the regime than to the state institution and a hybridized judiciary system rendered as an executive appendage. Lack of political and economic accountability, inequitable distribution of natural resource proceeds, uneven infrastructure development between the regions and the misrepresentation of state power’s equity among ethnic communities.
With Nigeria on the eve of a general election, not only is the political destiny of this aspiring hegemon in the balance, the political and economic stability of West and Central African economic blocs holds its breath with crossed-fingers that all goes well at the polls, that political factions refrain from any forms of post-election violence which given Nigeria’s subnational entities could flare into widespread civil strife. For a state like Cameroon whose largest trading partner is Nigeria, this will lead to a cataclysmic disruption of value and supply chains, sending Cameroon’s political economy deeper into an uncertain abyss. Cameroon is several attritive conflicts; fighting separatist militias in its two restive English-speaking regions, wading-off incursions from the Boko Haram terror group from North East Nigeria along with an influx of refugees, armed robbery, cattle rustling and ransom kidnapping from its porous border with Chad into the Sudans. An air of insecurity and humanitarian crisis looms in the East region, following rebel activities in the Central African Republic. The South region experiences stability except for emi-immigration tensions against Cameroonians by its southern neighbours.
A steady inflation and increase in commodity and basic necessity prices is not helping the narrative either for the Cameroon regime, which often uses national sports as an instrument for national cohesion and dispersion of civil discontent. Apart from currency issues, Cameroon can probably withstand ruptures in its Central African bloc but will not remain afloat if its giant neighbour Nigeria goes burst, though this may not hold vice versa for Nigeria. It is in the national and survival interest of both and Cameroon especially, that civil-military cooperation between these two states remains strong. Concessions may be made if political elites in both states will it for the peace, although Cameroon diplomatic posture on the matter is discretionary, the issue in Nigeria is spoken from the streets in Calabar to the presidency in Abuja. Hopefully the successor regime in Nigeria after February’s election may follow the 2002 Obasanjo foreign policy doctrine.
Nwanatifu Nwaco, 2023
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